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One defining claim that critical phenomenologists make of  the critical phenomenological 
method is that description no longer simply plays the role of  detailing the world around the 
describing phenomenologist, but rather has the potential to transform worlds and persons.1 
The transformative potential of  the critical phenomenological enterprise is motivated by 
aspirations of  social and political transformation. Critical phenomenology accordingly takes, 
as its starting point, descriptions of  the oppressive historical social structures and contexts 
that have shaped our experience and shows how these produce inequitable ways of  being 
in the world (Guenther 2020, 12). For example, critical phenomenologists have provided 
rich descriptions of  marginalized lived experience, particularly racialized experience (Ngo 
2017; Yancy 2017), dis-abled experience and experiences of  illness (Lajoie and Douglas 
2020; Toombs 1993), gendered experience (Beauvoir 2009; Salamon 2010), and so forth. 
What is common across these accounts is the assumption that these descriptions provide 
means of  enacting political change. First, they illuminate the existence of  oppressive 
structures and their effects upon us, our possibilities, and our relations. Second, through 
increasing awareness they begin to denaturalize the oppressive historical structures that 
“privilege, naturalize, and normalize certain experiences of  the world while marginalizing, 
pathologizing, and discrediting others” (Guenther 2020, 15). Third, through strategic 
responses (e.g., hesitation in Alia Al-Saji’s work), they produce new possibilities of  action 
and experience, which initiates the process of  creating different ways of  being in the world 
(Al-Saji 2014).2
1 Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers and the editorial team at Puncta for their helpful suggestions 
and feedback.
2 When I call Al-Saji’s concept of  hesitation a strategic response that produces new possibilities for 
action and experience, I am following Al-Saji’s proposal that hesitation is a way to interrupt racializing 
perception (2014). According to Al-Saji, racializing perception overdetermines racialized bodies through 
a mechanism of  othering. When the tacit perceptual practices that sustain racialized perception become 
habitual, the process of  racializing others via perception proceeds very rapidly. Racializing perception 
occurs faster than thought, which means that critical anti-racist intervention needs to occur at the level of  
perception itself. Hesitating becomes a way to slow down our perception in order to make it responsive to 
what it encounters and to also open up a space for critically assessing its features (147).
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 Critical phenomenological description thus provides a richer sense of  how our 
experience is not neutral but is shaped by oppressive systems of  power. A richer sense of  
how power shapes lived experience can—and should—motivate different ways of  living. 
As Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon (2020) write, critical phenomenology 
is “an ameliorative phenomenology that seeks not only to describe but also to repair the world, 
encouraging generosity, respect, and compassion for the diversity of  our lived experiences” 
(xiv, author’s emphasis). Or as Lisa Guenther (2020) similarly claims, “as a transformative 
political practice, critical phenomenology must go beyond a description of  oppression, 
developing concrete strategies for dismantling oppressive structures and creating or 
amplifying different, less oppressive, and more liberatory ways of  Being-in-the-world” (16).
 In these regards, critical phenomenologists have effectively used descriptions of  historical 
and social structures to show how those structures shape our experiences, possibilities, and 
subjectivities. Given this, I contend that much of  this work has focused on how power—
manifested from the outside and then internalized—structures our existence by producing 
oppressive ways of  living. But are we entirely shaped by these external structures? After 
all, if  critical phenomenology assumes that we can make changes to established practices, 
even at the level of  the structure of  experience and the form of  subjectivity itself, then what 
makes it possible for us to decide that we might want to live differently in the first place? 
What changes must take place within us to motivate us to try and live differently, and what 
must we do to follow through with our desire for change? 
 To explore these questions, I suggest that Edith Stein’s account of  the person, with 
its capacity for self-formation, ought to be recuperated by critical phenomenology. Stein’s 
description of  self-formation through value modification provides a model for thinking 
about how we become ourselves. From Stein, we learn that the values we hold shape 
who we are insofar as they motivate our feelings, actions, and desires, and thus compose 
our personal characteristics. As each of  us are personally defined by the values we hold 
and how we comport ourselves towards those values, for Stein, all persons should be 
understood as valuing beings. However, persons also have a “developmental character” 
[Entwicklungscharakter der Menschen], which means that we are not fixed in our values; we can 
confirm, reject, revise, or adopt values (1994).3 
 In what follows, I examine the question of  how we can decide to live differently in the 
first place. In section one, I explore how Edith Stein’s thinking of  self-formation is a useful 
contribution to critical phenomenological projects, insofar as it allows us to bring to light 
the role that values play in structuring our actions, feelings, and desires, as well as how value 
modification can change how we live by changing who we are. Drawing on On the Problem of  
Empathy (1989), Philosophy of  Psychology and Humanities (2000), Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person 
3 The developmental character of  the human is due in part to one’s personal freedom. While we are 
never determined from without because we have the power to choose how to behave and what to value, 
we are also not self-generated but are shaped by our contexts and circumstances. In this way, for Stein, 
the person is free, but this freedom is limited and situated. In other words, the person develops in the 
tension between self-formation and determining forces.
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(1994), and Essays on Woman (1996), I show how, according to Stein, we are persons with 
personalities, we experience values in the world, and we can take up attitudes towards what 
we experience.4 Our personal development involves self-formation, in which we decide 
who we want to be and how we want to live by modifying our values. Importantly, however, 
this process is possible only through empathy, which means that self-formation is not the 
project of  an individual who is alone in the world and entirely self-generated but is instead 
intersubjectively grounded. Because we empathize with the other, we can bring ourselves 
into relief  and establish what is mine and what is other. When empathizing with another 
in this way, we can discover how we appear to them through a mechanism Stein names 
“reiterative empathy.” From this, we form an image of  ourselves in the world and these 
images deepen or challenge our self-knowledge and provide the impetus for the personal 
development that takes place in self-formation. 
 Having laid out Stein’s account of  the person and the role values play in self-formation, 
and in order to illustrate what this account can show us, I next apply Stein’s account to Iris 
Marion Young’s now-classic account of  inhibited feminine bodily comportment.5 In section 
two, I first examine Young’s account of  how sexist oppression motivates certain behavior 
by instituting and sustaining bodily habits. I show what is gained through a critical focus 
on power structures in Young’s phenomenological description, namely, a robust illustration 
of  how patriarchal forces operate to produce white, heterofeminine comportment. With an 
eye towards questioning how we should respond to Young’s account, I suggest that it follows 
from Young’s essay that we can change how some persons experience living through their 
bodies by changing bodily habits. I further claim, however, that fully understanding how 
persons can develop themselves in the face of  a patriarchal world requires us to go beyond 
a consideration of  habits, by also questioning what makes it possible for us to decide that 
we might want to live differently in the first place. 
 I then bring Stein’s arguments for self-formation to bear on the problem of  responding 
to inhibited feminine bodily comportment in order to show how Stein’s account of  value-
modification contributes to both elucidating how inhibited feminine bodily comportment 
is experienced and provides tools to get beyond this way of  living. Here, I illustrate the 
process of  value modification and show the role this process plays in supporting the 
personal development needed to change bodily habits and open new possibilities for girls 
and women. 
 In the third and final section, I position the project of  value-modification as a useful 
tool for critical phenomenology, insofar as it provides concrete means for realizing the 
transformative promise of  critical phenomenology. I suggest that Stein’s theory can fruitfully 
4 Due to Edith Stein’s elaborate conceptual apparatus, one frequently sees Stein scholars provide evidence 
for claims made in the body of  an article in extensive footnotes. To maintain the flow of  this article, I 
adopt this convention throughout the article.
5 The presumed white heterofeminity of  Young’s work must be acknowledged. As Susan K. Cahn (2015) 
has shown in “‘Cinderellas’ of  Sport: Black Women in Track and Field,” feminine bodily comportment 
has always been raced and classed. Accordingly, Young’s description applies only to a select few.
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show how it is that we can decide to live differently and, thus, begin the work of  pushing 
back against oppressive structures that naturalize certain ways of  living and experiencing. 
I. PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AS VALUE MODIFICATION:
EDITH STEIN ON SELF-FORMATION
The person is a central theme of  Stein’s writings.6 In what follows, I limit my discussion 
of  Stein’s concept of  the person to three central ideas: first, a consideration of  empathy as 
a condition of  self-formation; second, the role values play in shaping our personality and 
our behavior; and third, the process of  value modification as self-formation. As I show, for 
Stein, empathy is the condition of  possibility for self-formation, and thus, the development 
of  our personalities over the course of  our lives. By providing us not only with knowledge of  
the other, but also of  ourselves, empathy allows us to actively shape who we become. In this 
way, we initially learn to reflect upon ourselves as we are in the world with others through 
empathy. Ultimately, from Stein, we learn that choosing our values shapes how we live by 
influencing our behavior and desires.
ON EMPATHY AS A CONDITION OF SELF-FORMATION
Stein’s phenomenological exploration of  empathy in her dissertation, On the Problem of  
Empathy, paints a picture of  empathy that departs from our colloquial understanding of  the 
term.7 While our working cultural understanding of  empathy tends to name our experience 
of  feeling another person’s feelings, and thereby understanding their experience, Stein’s 
account of  empathy portrays a more fundamental act. That is, empathy is a fundamental 
act whereby the experience of  others is comprehended by us as other. Thus, while for Stein 
empathy does involve feeling into another’s experience, it more importantly names our 
experience of  becoming aware of  another person’s experience as other than our own within 
6 Many elements that arise in Stein’s discussions of  the person are familiar to critical phenomenologists. 
For example, Stein writes in Essays on Woman that the human being is always being in the world (Stein 
1996), a theme which becomes a guiding thread for phenomenological research, especially in Martin 
Heidegger (1923), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945), and Emmanuel Levinas (1961). In addition, Stein 
anticipates some discussions on the nature of  the body found in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of  Perception. 
Finally, Stein emphasizes time and again the primacy of  intersubjectivity, be it in her phenomenological 
descriptions of  empathy or her descriptions of  our experience of  larger social and political realities, for 
example, the social relations of  the mass, society, and community.
7 The translated term empathy is Einfühlung in the original German, which can be more literally translated 
as “feeling-into.”
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the flow of  our own consciousness.8 This experience is fundamental for understanding 
ourselves as well as others in the world.9
 In this regard, empathy is a unique perceptual act for Stein. It is similar to outer 
perception, or perception of  external objects, insofar as both empathy and outer perception 
intend an object that is given in a here and now (i.e., the experience of  this other person 
who is presently in front of  me).10 However, empathy differs from outer perception insofar 
as what is intended is given as belonging to someone else (i.e., it is their experience, not mine) 
(1989, 6-7, 10-11). In other words, the other’s experience given in empathy does not emerge 
from my “I.”11 For example, let us say that I am in line at a grocery store. The person 
directly to my left appears impatient. Their arms are crossed, and their toes are tapping 
as they shift their weight restlessly. They cast their gaze about as they compare the various 
check-out lines to estimate which one will have the shortest wait time. Through empathy, 
I perceive their impatience without participating in it myself, and in my perception of  
their impatience, I recognize that it is their experience—not mine—although I discover 
their experience in the flow of  my own experience. In this regard, empathy allows me to 
experience the content of  another person’s experience as their experience (11). But empathy 
is not only limited to experiencing and knowing the experiences of  another person.
 Through empathy, we bring ourselves and our experience into relief  with the experience 
of  another, and in so doing we may also develop a richer sense of  our own self  as well as 
of  our experience. If  empathy is a form of  perception that allows us to grasp another’s 
experience, then through this process we come to knowledge of  their experience. However, 
part of  their experience includes their empathizing of  us. The capacity to empathize another’s 
experience of  ourselves is what Stein (1989) names reiterative empathy (18). In reiterative 
8 According to Stein (1989), sharing another person’s feelings is an instance of  “emotional contagion,” 
not empathy (23).
9 For Stein, empathy goes so far as to provide the ground for objective knowledge of  the world (and thus 
enables the project of  phenomenology to get off the ground). As Alasdair MacIntyre (2006) notes, Stein’s 
work on empathy shows how Husserl’s entire phenomenological enterprise depends upon a treatment of  
Einfühlung, for only via empathy is there a ground for knowledge of  others, objects, world, and self  (75-
76). While this topic remains largely outside the scope of  my paper, I contend that Stein’s discussion of  
self-formation demonstrates how empathy is a condition for self-formation thanks to how it both creates 
a space for critical self-reflection and also provides the material we work with while self-reflecting.
10 Stein (1989) defines outer perception as “acts in which spatio-temporal concrete being and occurring 
come to me in embodied givenness” (6). For example, perception of  external objects happens through 
outer perception. The object is spatially and temporally present to me. When I perceive it, I immediately 
perceive one of  its embodied aspects.
11 Stein (1986) further explains this point with two distinctions: (1) the distinction between what is 
primordial and non-primordial, as well as (2) between act and content. What is primordial is what is 
immediately given within experience. For example, outer perception yields spatio-temporal objects 
immediately (6). Non-primordial experience involves what is not immediately given in experience. 
Memories are good examples of  non-primordial experience, because while a memory recalls something 
that was once primordial, it is now only represented in experience (7). Empathy is a unique phenomenon 
because it is both primordial and non-primordial. It is a primordial act, insofar as the act occurs as present 
experience (10). However, the content of  this act is non-primordial because this content is lived experience 
not immediately issuing from my “I” (rather, it issues from another person’s I).
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empathy, we empathize the content of  another person’s empathized act, which can give 
us insight into their comprehension of  us or of  other persons. Say I am the one being 
empathized. In this case, I am a part of  what the other has intended. Accordingly, when 
I grasp their experience through empathy, I also receive the part of  their experience that 
includes their empathized experience of  me. This means that when my empathy intends 
their experience, I am given their empathized content of  my experience. Such content is, 
in short, their perception of  my experience. In this way, reiterative empathy allows me to 
receive my original experience as an empathized one. The other has already constituted me 
as an individual based upon the psychic life exhibited by my bodily expressions and actions, 
and when I empathize their image of  me, I see how I appear to them.
 Reiterative empathy is key for self-awareness and self-knowledge. Inner perception can 
only give us part of  the picture of  our being. For example, by virtue of  reflecting upon 
our experience, we discover that we are embodied beings who live in the world. We are 
oriented spatially, experience sensations, and are expressive. However, the empathized 
image of  ourselves as given in reiterative empathy provides a much fuller sense of  who we 
are, insofar as it allows us to see ourselves as we appear to others. We can then compare 
our inner experience of  ourselves with how we appear to others, which provides us with 
multiple viewpoints on ourselves. Diversifying our viewpoints on ourselves can help us to 
become aware of  instances of  self-deception on the one hand and can provide the ground 
for correcting the perceptions others have of  us on the other.12 Say, for example, that I 
have recently donated funds to a charitable organization. I might consider this act of  
seeming good will an altruistic act and think that it suggests that I have a giving disposition. 
However, the content of  reiterative empathy may suggest an alternative interpretation of  
my character based upon this same act: namely, that my charitable donation is the result 
of  a psychological egoism that seeks validation from performing acts of  apparent good 
will. Through reiterative empathy I can then discover my own self-deception. Alternately, 
perhaps I compare this data with my own experience of  myself  and conclude that while 
it may appear to others that I was not giving altruistically, I did indeed have altruistic 
motivations. Whatever the result, when I compare the information received through inner 
perception and empathic perception, I come to a richer sense of  who I am. These two 
sources of  self-knowledge can thus complexify, correct, and confirm my self-perception.  
12 We can receive damaging images of  ourselves from others. The other does not perceive us neutrally 
but inserts us into a pre-existing framework, one which defines in advance how we are to be interpreted. 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon (2008) powerfully illustrates the violence that can happen when 
racialized and colonized individuals are returned to themselves. In the fifth chapter, Fanon describes the 
experience of  being given to himself  by the white child who objectifies him, leading to the collapse of  his 
body schema and the installation of  a racial epidermal schema. In this gesture, “my body was returned 
to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day” (93). He is 
“overdetermined from the outside . . . A slave not to the ‘idea’ others have of  me, but to my appearance” 
(95). Bringing Stein into the conversation here suggests that images of  ourselves from others are received 
through the mechanism of  reiterative empathy.
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 There is an additional way in which reiterative empathy can increase self-knowledge. As 
Sarah Borden (2003) argues, when we grasp another’s view of  us, we create an opportunity 
to realize latent personal possibilities (30). One such personal possibility involves the 
development of  character traits. Through reiterative empathy, we may discover ourselves 
to be lacking certain traits, but this discovery itself  may motivate us to develop those traits. 
Consider the example of  courage to clarify this point. When I see an individual exhibit 
courage, the self-understanding that arises from my reiterated empathy of  their experience 
may show me the lack of  courage in my current character. However, we may also discover 
in us an ability to become courageous. Following this, then, I may be able to realize courage 
as a character trait arising from this encounter. In short, the empathic encounter provides us 
with an opportunity for critical self-reflection, especially when it comes to elucidating self-
deception. Such critical self-reflection enables the possibility for realizing latent personal 
possibilities, especially with regards to the development of  different character traits. 
 By enabling the possibility of  critical self-reflection and self-evaluation, empathy plays 
a crucial role in allowing for self-growth. Empathy is thus a ground for self-formation. But 
what else is involved in self-formation? In the next section, I explore values as the second 
component of  self-formation. There can be no self-formation without values, since self-
formation develops our personality and our personality is both disclosed by and constituted 
through our values. 
THE PLACE AND ROLE OF VALUES IN PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR
In Stein’s (1989) view, each person has a personality and an ability to value. The human 
ability to value is so crucial a feature to understanding specific persons (as well as to 
understanding the concept of  the person in general), that in On the Problem of  Empathy Stein 
writes: “it is impossible to formulate a doctrine of  the person . . . without a value doctrine, 
and that the person can be obtained from such a value doctrine” (108). Similarly, in Philosophy 
of  Psychology and the Humanities (2000), she notes that “as it were, we see what the person is 
when we see which world of  value she lives in, which values she is responsive to, and what 
achievements she may be creating, prompted by values” (227). Hence, to grasp how Stein 
understands who we as individuals are, as well as how we act and how we feel, we must 
examine our values to see how they structure our behavior and personality. In what follows, 
first, I briefly review how Stein understands values. Second, I show how our personal values 
are revealed in emotional experiences and in experiences of  willing. Third, I consider how 
values come to constitute persons, such that we can be understood through them. 
 While Stein never defines her use of  the term “value,” she does describe the experience 
of  valuing, in which we grasp values through feelings. For Stein, there is no such thing as a 
value-free world. Each time we constitute an object through perception, we simultaneously 
constitute the value of  that object. We can abstract into a theoretical stance, in which 
case objects can appear as mere things, but otherwise we are always axiologically oriented, 
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which means that we discover things through their values: be those aesthetic, ethical, or 
religious values (160). In being axiologically oriented, we are attuned to experience through 
feeling, and those feelings disclose values to us.13 As Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (2017) writes, 
“on Stein’s view, in the same sense that perceiving makes accessible the objects of  the 
physical world such as colors and sounds, the act of  feeling makes values accessible to 
us” (76). An example is helpful here. When I perceive a maple tree in autumn in a cooler 
climate, after its foliage has begun to change but before the leaves have fallen, I don’t just 
see the tree as an object; rather, I am struck by the beauty of  the tree. The beauty inspires 
various feelings, perhaps of  gladness, awe, and peace. The beauty is the value of  the tree; 
the feelings of  joy, awe, and peace are what disclose the beauty of  the maple tree and show 
how we value it. 
 Now that we understand how Stein envisions values in a general sense, and specifically 
how values are revealed through our feelings, we can look more closely at how our personal 
values are discovered in our emotional experiences. To understand this, let us consider 
Stein’s comparison of  our feelings over three different kinds of  loss. She suggests that our 
feeling of  anger over a lost piece of  jewelry is likely more superficial than the feeling that 
we experience when we lose jewelry that was a souvenir from a loved one. The latter feeling 
penetrates more deeply than the former. Deeper still, however, would be our pain over the 
loss of  the loved one themselves. This is because the loved one is more deeply valued than 
their jewelry, and their jewelry is more deeply valued than a different piece of  jewelry: 
a fact disclosed by the difference between our feelings. Hence, as Stein writes (1989), 
“this [variation in our emotional experiences] discloses essential relationships among the 
hierarchy of  felt values, the depth classification of  value feelings, and the level classification 
of  the person exposed in these feelings” (101). In other words, our value feelings not only 
reveal what values we personally hold, but, further, how we value those values. While both 
pieces of  jewelry and the loved one were all valuable, they were valued in different ways, as 
was reflected by how the loss of  each reached a different level in us.14 
 Not only are our values discovered in experiences of  feelings; they are also discovered 
in experiences of  willing, or the activity of  the free will. We discover our values in what 
we will because willing is based on feeling, and feelings are grounded on values (Stein 
13 Technically speaking, Stein distinguishes between the act of  grasping values and the feeling of  values.
As Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (2017) points out, this allows Stein to explain instances when we are aware 
of  a value without fully feeling it (77-78). For example, having witnessed the joy soap operas give my 
grandmother, I am aware of  their value, but I do not personally feel their value. In this paper, I am 
interested exclusively in instances where we are made aware of  personal values through feeling.
14 Stein (1989) will argue that our value hierarchies and our value feelings are rationally grounded and, 
further, that there are possible “right” or “wrong” ways of  being ordered in these regards. Poorly ordered 
hierarchies are reflective of  irrationality, and properly ordered hierarchies are reflective of  rationality. As 
she writes, “if  someone is ‘overcome’ by the loss of  his wealth … he feels irrational” (101). Presumably, 
this is because the loss of  wealth should not be such a deep loss that it overcomes us and leaves us feeling 
entirely bereft, and that if  we are so overcome, then our values are not well-ordered.
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1989, 108).15 This means that willing discloses our values because our action is motivated 
by our values.16 Our actions do not occur from out of  nowhere, but instead emerge from 
a meaning context. This meaning context Stein names motivation. Motivation is the 
temporal connection between acts that structures the unique flow of  our experience (40-
41). Motivation structures the arising of  experiences by motivating each act, one out of  
the other. In this regard, because our actions are motivated, they arise out of  our history 
of  prior acts, and are meaningful based on that history. While motivation creates a strong 
connectivity between acts, it does not necessitate our action, as we also experience an 
element of  freedom understood as a commitment to the doing on our part (55).17 This 
means that actions are motivated and include a “fiat!,” that is, an “inner jolt” or an impulse 
that is not itself  motivated (2000, 55, 57). Willed actions thus reflect our values because our 
values motivate actions, and further, because our actions involve an inner commitment to 
those motivating values.
 The concepts of  motivation and value explain how we understand persons. Everyone’s 
psychic life is structured as the flow of  motivations that specifically pertains to them. 
Because their values are their motives, everything someone does or feels reflects their 
personally held values. Hence, as Marianne Sawicki (2001) reflects, “we come to know 
unique persons through the unique patterns they create by their choices among rationally 
motivated options—or sometimes by their irrational refusals of  them” (84). Or as Mette 
Lebech (2010) explains, 
[w]e experience concrete human persons to be carriers of  value in 
a variety of  ways. We evaluate their character, for example, which 
we constitute from our understanding of  their value-response, in 
particular from the order in which we see them place the values, 
their value-hierarchy. The personality of  a person is, according to 
Stein, the specificity of  the person determined or stamped by its 
character… Personality is not however, like the person, pure spiritual 
capacity: it is this capacity as already determined in certain ways 
by typical or decisive value responses… The personality reflects the  
 
 
15 “This feeling of  value is the source of  all cognitive striving and ‘what is at the bottom’ of  all cognitive 
willing” (Stein 1989, 108).
16 “Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection that acts get into with one another: not a mere 
blending like that of  simultaneously or sequentially ebbing phases of  experiences, or the associative tying 
together of  experiences, but an emerging of  the one out of  the other, a self  fulfilling or being fulfilled of  
the one on the basis of  the other for the sake of the other” (Stein 2000, 41). As psychic causality, motivation 
is similar to natural causality insofar as it functions to create a coherence in psychic reality, but it differs 
from natural causality because it does not involve necessity. All our mental acts are motivated and thus 
their emergence creates a meaning context.
17 “But the availability of  motives does not compel the ego to accomplish the acts in question. These acts
do not simply impose themselves on grounds of  motives, as attitudes to. The ego can have and acknowledge 
the motives and it can abstain from the acts in spite of  that” (Stein 2000, 55).
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choices of  the person and marks what he has done with himself  as a 
person; it is the source of  the specificity of  the person’s spontaneity 
and the first expression of  the person’s creativity as such. (147-48) 
Because every person is a carrier of  values, every person can be understood through the way 
they respond to their values. Every individual has their unique set of  values and their unique 
way of  classifying values, and it is through how they respond to those values that you can 
come to know who they are. When it comes to our own values, we aren’t immediately aware 
of  our values but can discover them through reflection upon our feelings and our actions. 
This is especially the case regarding values we have picked up without even realizing it. We 
might even discover that we hold different values than we thought when we empathize with 
others and see our actions and expressions from their perspective. In any case, our values as 
motives produce the unique way each of  us have of  realizing values. Our unique ways of  
realizing our values thus becomes our style of  living.
 For these reasons, we are not immediately transparent to ourselves, but need self-
reflection and, more specifically, empathic experiences with others to discover our values. 
As we saw earlier, reiterative empathy provides the opportunity for self-evaluation by way 
of  increasing self-knowledge and enabling self-critique. Hence, reiterative empathy can 
become the ground for evaluating our values. As Stein (1989) writes:
[w]e not only learn to make ourselves into objects, as earlier, but 
through empathy with “related natures,” i.e., persons of  our type, 
what is “sleeping” in us is developed. By empathy with differently 
composed personal structures we become clear on what we are 
not, what we are more or less than others. Thus, together with self  
knowledge, we also have an important aid to self  evaluation. Since 
the experience of  value is basic to our own value, at the same time 
as new values are acquired by empathy, our own unfamiliar values 
become visible. When we empathically run into ranges of  value 
closed to us, we become conscious of  our own deficiency or disvalue. 
Every comprehension of  different persons can become the basis of  
an understanding of  value. (116)
Through empathy, we measure ourselves against the other and discover values we hold as 
well as values we do not. We see ourselves and others as persons, or as value-creating or 
value-holding beings. We discover our personality through acts of  empathy and are given 
the opportunity to create or reject those values based upon that discovery. Accordingly, 
it is only through experiences of  empathy as well as critical self-reflection that we can 
begin the process of  explicit self-formation that can enable value confirmation, rejection, 
modification, or adoption. To explain this claim further, let us now turn to an explanation 
of  self-formation through value-modification for Stein. 
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ON SELF-FORMATION THROUGH VALUE-MODIFICATION
We have already seen how values shape our personalities; what remains to be shown is 
how—and to what extent—we can choose our values and thus participate in forming our 
personalities.18 As Antonio Calcagno (2014) puts it, “Stein claims that, in choosing certain 
values, we become aware that these values affect and structure who we are; they shape 
certain of  our attributes and help to structure and unfold what Stein calls our personality” 
(99-100). For Stein, once we become aware of  the role values play in informing our 
personalities, we can actively participate in value creation. Because the ego is the “boss” 
of  its own experience, it can confirm, reject, or adopt a value on the basis of  information 
received in the course of  experience (2000, 52). From this, pertinent value feelings arise, as 
do desires and actions: “The grasping of  a value can motivate a disposition (for example, joy 
in beauty) and, accordingly, a wanting and doing (perhaps the realizing of  a state of  affairs 
recognized as morally right)” (42). In this way, discovering our values through our value 
feelings can motivate us to choose or reject values, and through this activity, we actively 
participate in choosing our own personal attributes and thereby shaping our personality.
 More specifically, we can participate in shaping our comportment toward our own 
values through our attitudes.19 Attitudes occur to me based upon how I take up the object 
of  an experience (Stein 2000, 48). I am passive in the face of  attitudes; they seize me. 
However, Stein notes that we can “take a stance” toward attitudes. We can accept or deny 
them. That is,
I can “take a stance” toward the attitude, in a new sense. I can 
accept it, plant my feet upon it, and declare my allegiance to it; or, I 
can comport myself  negatively against it. Suppose I accept it—that 
means that if  it emerges in me I give myself  over to it, joyously, 
without reluctance. Suppose I deny it—that doesn’t mean I eliminate 
it. That’s not under my control. “Canceling out” a belief  would 
require new motives, through which the motives of  the original 
18 According to Stein (1989), if  we don’t choose to self-form, then we can’t become ourselves in a genuine 
manner. Stein describes the possibility that we may feel and act according to how we are “supposed” 
to feel and act, and not from a genuine feeling. In this case, Stein would say that we haven’t become 
ourselves. We aren’t in touch with ourselves and have not become a personality. Nor have we assumed 
our freedom and our responsibility for that freedom (111).
19 Stein (2000) does not explain the nature of  attitudes [Stellungnahme, literally “position-taking”]
as thoroughly as one might hope. Some examples of  attitudes include the natural attitude and the 
phenomenological attitude, or even a romantic feeling towards someone (whether you assent to the feeling 
or struggle against it is another question). Stein (1996) also defines an ethos as a spiritual attitude and 
claims that an ethos is an inner-position taking with regards to values that provides an organizing form to 
the person’s comportment. From various discussions, it seems that attitudes have a judgement component 
(insofar as they are position-takings on values); they are unwilled and involuntary; they are grounded on 
the value-object that motivates them; they have an affective dimension (or are at least inwardly related to 
affectivity); and they arise as “alive” and “operative” but can be rendered “inoperative.” Clarifying fully 
Stein’s concept of  an attitude is a project for another paper. 
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belief  are invalidated and from which the cancellation is established 
instead “all by itself.” But I need not acknowledge this belief. I can 
comport myself  just as though it were not present; I can make it 
inoperative. (It is this, the comporting, that Husserl designated as 
epochē. The acts rendered inoperative are “neutralized.” (49) 
Adopting or denying an attitude is itself  a motivated act (50). Accordingly, if  I want to 
change how I comport myself  in relation to a value, I can deny the attitude that the value 
motivates, and in this way, I push back against the feelings that the value arouses. To supplant 
the original attitude, the new attitude requires a motive that is either stronger or more 
deeply valued than the original value motive; merely eliminating the attitude is impossible. 
As Lebech (2015) writes, “[t]hat means I place one value as more important than another, 
or recognize in one value a higher motivating power than in the other” (37). This deeper 
value will become the stronger motive, and if  repeatedly realized, will take on a formative 
role in shaping who we become over time, at least in part by eventually invalidating the 
original motive. In this way, we can revise our values through the stances we take toward 
our attitudes. In doing so we install new motives, themselves motivated by different values, 
and we designate these new values as more important than the preceding values. 
 Due to our capacity for value-modification, we experience (limited and situated) 
freedom for self-formation. We can choose the values to commit to and the ones to supplant. 
However, we are not entirely self-generated beings. We are shaped by what we encounter in 
empathic experiences. We are also shaped by the world we are born into and the structures 
we inherit in those worlds. Our bodies also present natural limits to our freedom. Similarly, 
our own personal histories both enable and restrict our options, insofar as they form the 
meaningful context from which our possibilities arise. The point I wish to make is that 
within these limitations, we have an ability to decide whether we want to be for or against 
the values, feelings, and actions that compose our lives and shape our personalities. In this, 
we confirm, reject, or adopt new values, and through this activity we decide how we want 
to comport ourselves towards our values. 
 Following Stein, then, our values shape how we behave and who we as persons are, 
which means that to change our behavior and our character, we need to change our values. 
In other words, in order to decide that we might want to change some of  the habits that 
hold us back, we need not only to change our environments and adapt new behaviors, but 
also change the values we hold so that we can be motivated towards different actions in the 
first place. In order to illustrate this claim more thoroughly, in the following sections I put 
Young’s account of  inhibited feminine bodily intentionality into conversation with Stein’s 
account of  self-formation as value-modification. 
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II. HOW DO WE CHANGE INHIBITED FEMININE BODILY INTENTIONALITY?  
RECONCILING YOUNG AND STEIN
Many of  us are familiar with Iris Marion Young’s (1980) analysis in “Throwing like a 
Girl.” In order to consider how feminine bodily comportment develops as a style of  being, 
Young draws on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of  the lived body—particularly as it 
pertains to the way the lived body aims toward the accomplishment of  tasks—and Simone 
de Beauvoir’s understanding of  women’s situation as a tension between immanence and 
transcendence. Summarizing Young’s analysis is outside the scope of  this paper, so I shall 
limit myself  to discussing only a few of  the main points. 
 According to Young, there is a typically feminine style of  comportment, which is an 
inhibited style of  comportment that does not make use of  the body’s full capabilities. 
Women hesitate when using their bodies, both because they lack confidence in their 
own bodily capacities and because they fear getting hurt. Accordingly, “[women] often 
experience [their] bodies as a fragile encumberance [sic], rather than the media for the 
enactment of  [their] aims” (144). As a result, women “throw like girls”: instead of  bringing 
their whole bodies into action when throwing a ball, by drawing the arms apart and 
stepping forward into the throw, women focus their efforts on the wrist and elbow, flicking 
the ball in a general direction. 
 Young identifies several sources that encourage this behavior. In general, inhibited 
feminine comportment is due to women’s situation—that is, her existence in a patriarchal 
society: “Insofar as we learn to live out our existence in accordance with the definition that 
patriarchal culture assigns to us,” Young writes, “we are physically inhibited, confined, 
positioned, and objectified” (144). Young does indicate more specific sources, however. 
For example, she notes both negative and positive forms of  socialization which encourage 
young girls to assume a feminine style of  bodily comportment. Young girls (and women as 
well) are not given the opportunity to learn how to freely engage with the world through 
their whole bodies. This constrains their opportunities to develop confidence in their own 
bodies and capabilities. At the same time, girls are encouraged to behave in restrictive 
“feminine” ways. Such encouragement actively inhibits their movement, promotes a lack 
of  confidence in their bodies, and redirects their focus onto other issues, such as how their 
bodies appear rather than of  what they are capable. These two sources help create the 
habits that form the basis for feminine bodily comportment. We can see this in the play 
between young girls; their movement is encouraged to be sedentary and enclosing, and 
their activities encourage them to control the use of  their bodies in specifically feminine 
ways (i.e., not getting dirty, sitting quiet and still, etc.). In short, girls are encouraged to live 
their bodies as objects and not as subjects.
 While Young does not offer specific recommendations towards changing women’s 
inhibited comportment, I propose that one response would be to encourage girls to relate 
to their bodies as subjects and to encourage them to build confidence in their bodily 
capacities. Encouraging girls to relate to their bodies as subjects can change sedimented 
habits of  spatial self-enclosure or stop those habits from taking hold in the first place. Such 
encouragement  is focused in part on bodily behavior and in part on creating environments 
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that would encourage girls to stretch out and feel empowered to take up space. But is 
there more that goes into changing women’s inhibited comportment than challenging 
and transforming bodily habits and changing environments?  For example, why might we 
decide that we want to live differently in the first place, or want other girls and women to 
be able to choose to live differently? And how do we begin the process of  living differently 
beyond changing bodily habits? What “inner” process precedes and supports our decision 
to modify our bodily habits?
 This is indeed where Stein’s account of  self-formation becomes helpful. Stein’s account 
of  self-formation illustrates that our decisions about how we want to live are decisions about 
our values: particularly the relationship between our values, our personal characteristics, 
and our behaviors. Bringing this account into conversation with Young’s insights shows 
that value-modification is a useful complement to Young’s account, insofar as it details 
how the personal development required to change how we live takes place. To illustrate 
this more fully, let us take as a starting point Young’s concept of  inhibited feminine bodily 
comportment and examine it in the context of  an example of  someone riding a public bus. 
To this I apply Stein’s account in order to show what her analysis contributes alongside 
Young’s. 
 There are many ways those who have internalized values with regards to inhibited 
feminine bodily comportment can experience those values. For simplicity’s sake, I will 
consider one scenario. The subject of  our example is on a public bus. They sit with their 
legs and arms crossed and take up as little space as possible. They have internalized 
the value that it is good to be a “properly feminine person,” which involves the set of  
expectations and norms that establish that properly feminine persons are small, quiet, 
and non-threatening. They have not yet in their lived experience encountered another 
set of  values which would bring this value to light and demonstrate for them how it has 
structured their experience and character. Accordingly, the value remains invisible, but 
this does not lessen its motivational power; rather, this value lives in the various feelings it 
evokes (for example, subtle feelings of  comfort when the subject meets the norm the value 
installs, as is the case in their present comportment on the bus, and feelings of  discomfort 
when they do not) as well as the various actions it evokes (for example, the crossing of  legs 
and arms). Then the subject of  our example reads Young’s essay and is deeply moved. 
Awed by the revelations they find in this text, for the first time they become aware of  their 
own internalized value of  inhibited feminine bodily comportment. They become further 
aware of  how this value has expressed itself  in their behavior, feelings, and desires, shaping 
their character and the sorts of  possibilities they have perceived themselves capable of  
realizing. What is next for our subject?
 The subject of  our example has many possibilities. For instance, they may carry on 
as they previously have. This they may do so for numerous reasons. For example, their 
behavior would not change if  they continued to accept the customary value of  inhibited 
bodily comportment and in this way embrace an affirmative attitude toward it. Alternately, 
they may not truly affirm the value, but for any variety of  reasons they may also choose not 
to supplant it. Certainly, various forms of  bodily comportment may be unsafe for certain 
individuals and/or in certain situations, which could motivate someone to not supplant a 
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new value or comport themselves differently with regards to their values. Or perhaps they 
do install a new value—that it is good for them to take up space—but this value does not 
take root deep enough in them to combat the motivating power of  the initial value. 
 We can follow Stein’s insights to understand at least part of  what takes place if  our 
subject does decide to install a new value. The subject may decide to contest their habitual 
way of  comporting themselves as a way of  contesting the value of  inhibited feminine 
bodily comportment and the norm this value instills. They attempt to interrupt their 
own habits in order to change how they live and experience themselves and others in the 
world. In this case, the subject must install a new value (that it is good to take up space) 
deep enough that it can supplant the original value, which will motivate a new attitude. In 
so doing, they reject the old value and refuse acquiescence to their initial feelings, actions, 
and desires, which is to say they have taken a stance and assumed an attitude that denies 
the original value’s motivating power. Then they have installed a new value, nurtured this 
value through an affirmative attitude, and embraced the feelings, actions, and desires that 
the new value motivates. This is what provided the impetus to change their habits in the 
first place and enables them to persist in this activity when the initial motivating surge of  
feelings that Young’s essay motivated has worn off. 
 Bringing Stein’s analysis into conversation with Young here shows how value 
modification can lead to personal development and supports the work of  changing bodily 
habits. Through self-formation, a space to step back and assess ourselves and our lives is 
appropriated. This work allows us to creatively commit to our values, and to embrace our 
developmental character in a spirit that leads to us assuming our freedom and responsibility 
in self-formation. Modifying our values shapes who we are by shaping how we live. 
 It is crucial, however, not to overestimate one’s freedom of  choice when all our choices 
are shaped by formative forces. As mentioned before, Stein herself  underscores how we are 
shaped by the worlds we are born into, by our empathic encounters with others, and by the 
experiences we have during our existence. In this way, insofar as she shows that the person 
is always intersubjective and shaped by material circumstances, her work complicates the 
received view that the classical phenomenological subject is individualistic. In various 
writings, Stein herself  highlights the influence culture, gender, our bodies, personal history, 
interpersonal relationships, material circumstances, our inherent predispositions, and our 
bodies have on self-formation.20 For Stein, while our egos are the boss of  our experiencing, 
we are not the sole masters of  our selves; our development is indebted to many formative 
forces, such that the agency we exert in our own formation is ultimately only one element 
in our development. Hence, while we do have freedom of  choice in self-formation, we do 
not have the ultimate say in who we become, nor is it entirely clear at any point the extent 
to which the choices we find available to us are shaped from without. 
20 For more on how culture, gender, history, material circumstances, and other influences shape our 
self-formative processes, see especially: On the Problem of  Empathy (1989), Philosophy of  Psychology and the 
Humanities (2000), Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1994), and Essays on Woman (1996). 
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III. STEIN’S CONTRIBUTION TO CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
In conclusion, I return briefly to my initial claim that Stein’s account of  self-formation is 
a useful contribution to the critical phenomenological project. Through Stein’s account, 
we begin to see just how it is that someone can decide to live differently and what such 
a process involves. That is, we discover how—through value modification—personal 
transformation takes place at the individual level. The change that follows from value-
modification encourages the development of  a different character and motivates different 
ways of  living and valuing. Without changing our values, we cannot change how we live, 
nor can we hope to change the larger structures and forces that shape our identities, 
relationships, and possibilities. 
 More specifically, Stein shows us how reiterative empathy serves to make the choice 
to change not an individualistic decision (although it is borne by individuals), but instead 
reflects our ties to others and to the world. Recalling how reiterative empathy allows us to 
deepen or challenge our self-image, we learn from Stein that it is through our encounters 
with others that the impetus for change in ourselves and our lives can even arise and 
become the basis for self-formation. Consider the well-meaning white person who believes 
that they are not racist. Through an interaction with another person they may discover 
their own racism, and this expanded self-knowledge may be the impetus for change. 
Robin DiAngelo describes such a moment for herself  when her colleague pointed out to 
her that her carefulness at not making a racist mistake is not only evident to others but 
is an expression of  her own internalized racism, one which motivated reserved and cold 
behavior toward people of  color. As DiAngelo (2016) writes: 
I suddenly felt uncovered as a white person. I realized that I expected 
my friend to see me as I saw myself—outside of  race. I also had a 
sudden realization of  what it must look like for people of  color when 
whites are being careful around them. We look stiff, uncomfortable, 
uptight, and reserved. As I pictured myself  being careful around 
people of  color in this way, I also saw why they experienced that as 
racism. I certainly wasn’t warm, relaxed, sincere, or open when I 
was being careful. (241)
From Stein’s account of  reiterative empathy, then, we see that it is because we exist with 
others that we may want to change, insofar as it is through reiterative empathy that we 
discover characteristics in us that we do not find valuable. Yet we also see that wanting to 
change must also come from within us in the form of  an inner commitment to different 
values and an attitudinal shift that supports the rooting of  new values (and the uprooting 
of  stale values). 
 From Stein we also discover how value-modification is both the process for self-
formation and can be deliberately appropriated as a tool for personal development. Once 
we become aware of  how self-formation works—namely, through value-modification—
we can take up this process deliberately. Indeed, Stein insists that our freedom as human 
beings comes in the form of  self-formation, and that our freedom is intertwined with our 
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responsibility for how we form ourselves.21 In other words, we assume our responsibility 
for ourselves when we deliberately engage in self-formation, and this is something that 
we accomplish through value-modification, through confirming, modifying, or negating 
values depending upon our larger views on who we want to be and how we want to live in 
the world with others.
 For this reason, I suggest that explicitly addressing self-formation through value-
modification is a useful tool for critical phenomenology. This account answers questions 
concerning our internal motivation for wanting to change how we live and respond to 
the world we live in. In addition, once we become explicitly aware of  the process, we can 
develop value-modification as a strategy and inquire directly into what it takes to truly 
supplant unhelpful or oppressive values. In short, as a project, value-modification continues 
the critical phenomenological project, for it provides tools to effect the transformation that 
critical phenomenology seeks and promises.  
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